Motivated by the 2008-2009 financial crisis and the trade collapse, we analyze the effect of past banking crises on trade with a focus on African exporters. We show that they are particularly vulnerable to a banking crisis in the countries they export to. We distinguish between an income effect (during a banking crisis, income and exports to the country fall) and a disruption effect (a banking crisis disrupts the financing of trade channels). For the average country, the disruption effect is moderate (a deviation from the gravity predicted trade of around 3 to 5%) but long lasting. We find however that the disruption effect is much larger for African exporters as the fall in trade (relative to gravity) is around 15% more than for other countries in the aftermath of a banking crisis. Part of the vulnerability of African exports in the short-run comes from a composition effect because primary exports are disrupted more severely than manufacturing exports. However, the dependence of African countries on trade finance dependence also explains the vulnerability of African exporters to banking crises in partner countries.
In this paper, we show that African exports are particularly vulnerable to a banking crisis in the countries they export to. Our work is motivated by the financial crisis of [2008] [2009] . Early in the financial crisis, a common view was that Africa's low level of financial integration may be a blessing in disguise, insulating this region from the direct impact of the financial crisis. Indeed, it may be that the direct wealth effect has been less important than in other regions more open in terms of financial flows. However, we show that African countries are more affected by the trade effect of banking crises and that the relative underdevelopment of financial systems in sub-saharan African countries, in particular the strong dependence on trade credit may make them more vulnerable to the disruption of trade finance that comes with a banking crisis.
One indication of the vulnerability of African countries on the trade side is given by US trade statistics on the period [2008] [2009] . Following the crisis, the fall of US imports from Sub-Saharan African countries has been more dramatic than from the rest of the world. As shown in Figure 1 , from September 2008 -the failure of Lehman on September 15 is often seen as the turning point of the crisis -the fall in US imports from African countries has been much stronger than from other countries. This is especially true for African manufacturing exports. This suggests that the fall in African exports is not only a composition effect due to the importance of primary goods and the fall in primary goods prices.
To strengthen the motivation of this paper, we can analyze more precisely the way the [2008] [2009] crisis affected African exports by a simple gravity type regression of US bilateral imports using monthly data from the US International Trade Commission on the period January 2005-August 2009. In this simple regression, we include seasonal country-month dummies µ jm (to control for seasonality effects and for country fixed effects) and time (month) dummies µ t . Hence, all determinants of US imports from a specific country which are constant over time, or specific to a month (in particular during the crisis or due to changes in commodity prices) are controlled for. We also control for monthly bilateral exchange rates. We are interested to see whether, during the crisis months, US imports from African countries declined more than imports from other countries, everything else equal. Hence, we include an interaction term between a binary variable which equals 1 during the period September 2008 to March 2009 1 (both months included), and a dummy SSA j that equals 1 when the exporter country is a Sub-Saharan African countries. We get the following result (where *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, and robust standard errors are indicated below the coefficient): log(m jt ) = −0.336 (0.020) * * * log (ER jt ) − 1.006 (0.201) * * * Crisis t × SSA j + µ jm + µ t (1) where m jt denotes US imports from country j in month t, ER jt is the (average) bilateral exchange rate between US and country j (an increase means a bilateral depreciation of the dollar). The negative and significant coefficient on the interaction between the crisis months and the African exporter dummies suggests that African exports to the US have been hit more strongly during the crisis. Quantitatively, the coefficient on the double interaction of dummies implies that, during the crisis, African exports to the US have decreased around 60% more than exports of other countries. The aim of the paper is to show that this is not a specificity of the 2008-2009 financial crisis and to try to investigate some reasons of this vulnerability of African exports to financial crises in their destination countries.
Using a large sectoral database of bilateral trade and of banking crises on the period 1972-2002, and a gravity equation approach, we quantify the deviation of exports from their "natural" level. The gravity approach which is now very standard in trade and has strong theoretical underpinnings, allows us to measure the deviation of bilateral exports from the "natural" level of bilateral trade as predicted by standard determinants such as GDPs, bilateral distance or trade agreements. We distinguish two mechanisms through which a financial crisis in a country affects the exports of other countries. There is first an income effect as banking crisis are typically associated with sharp recessions (see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008 and Claessens, Kose and Terrones, 2009), which lead to a fall in consumption and imports. Freund (2009) has shown that the elasticity of trade to income has increased in the past forty years.
According to Irwin (2002) this elasticity was around 2 in the 1960s and 1970s and increased to 3.4 in the 1990s. In this paper, we show that African exports are more sensitive to large negative income movements in the countries they trade with. This is true both for manufacturing and primary goods exports.
Second, for a given fall in income and demand, exports may be adversely hit by a banking crisis due to what we call a disruption effect. The disruption may take direct or more subtle forms. The most direct effect, one that has been widely discussed in policy circles is the fall in trade credit. There are however more subtle ways through which the banking crisis may negatively affect trade. In particular, although it is difficult to measure it, attitudes towards risk may change amongst bankers and traders during a banking crisis and this may affect more severely countries or groups of countries which are viewed as more risky. We show that the disruption effect on trade is more important and longer lasting for African countries than for exporters of other regions. Compared with other countries, the disruption effect is larger for African exporters and lasts several years after the occurrence of the event. Again, this disruption effect comes in addition to the fall of exports due to the fall of income and consumption.
This sharp difference applies both for primary products and manufactured goods. We also find that for African countries, the largest disruption effect comes when the destination country which is hit by a banking crisis is industrialized. Finally, using two different proxies for dependence on trade credit, we provide evidence that this dependence may explain part of the fragility of African exports to banking crisis in trade partners.
The pre-crisis economic literature delivers few insights on the effect of such an event on international trade. Most studies consider the role of international trade on the probability of occurrence of crises (Frankel and Cavallo, 2004) or on their transmission (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000, Glick and Rose, 1999) , showing in particular that trade linkages may explain crises contagion and their regional character.
The few papers looking at the impact of crises on trade generally focus on currency crises (Berman, 2009 , Campa, 2000 . Until very recently, the effect of banking crises has only been studied so far by Ma and
Cheng (2003), who find a negative impact of such events on imports and a positive impact on exports in the short-run in the country that experiences the crisis. We go further in this paper by studying the short and long-run effects of such events but focusing on the effect of exports to countries that are hit by a financial crisis. By so doing, we attempt to improve the understanding of the precise channels through which a financial crisis in the rest of the world is transmitted to a country's trade.
A banking crisis, by tightening financial constraints, may importantly affect the patterns of trade. The difference between African and others countries may lie in the type of financing used by exporters. While firms operating in countries with relatively developed financial markets can use the banking system to finance trading operations, African exporters rely on others sources, in particular trade finance provided by institutions in the destination country. Trade can be disrupted by a banking crisis that affects banks, risk aversion and trust in both the importing and exporting country. This is the case for letters of credit.
Importers use letters of credit issued by their banks (the issuing bank) as a means of assuring exporters that they will be paid. If the exporter submits the required documentation (invoices, bills of lading, etc.) to its bank (the advising or confirming bank), payment is made to the exporter. Letters of credit require both confidence and liquidity to provide finance and insurance about payment to the exporter.
If confidence or liquidity is missing at any point along the chain from the importer to the exporter then the mechanism will not function. The importer creditworthiness may be undermined, the issuing bank may have insufficient funds to extend credit to the importer. The confirming bank may also lack confidence in the issuing bank. An argument made by Auboin (2009) is also that with Basel II rules, when market conditions tighten, capital requirements for trade finance instruments tend to increase more than proportionally to the risk when the counterpart is in a developing country. Inter-firm trade credit may also be deficient during a financial crisis because of the perceived increase in the risk of non-payment. Section 2 describes the empirical strategy we choose to quantify the effect of a banking crisis in a gravity equation. Section 3 reports our main results on both the income effect and the disruption effect of past banking crises and the extent to which African countries were hit differently.
Empirical methodology
Baseline specification. Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006) . Our aim is to understand how a banking crisis in year t, country i (the importer country) affects exports of country j. We think about a banking crisis in the importer country as potentially affecting several of the standard determinants of the gravity equation that would typically be generated by a monopolistic competition trade model:
• the income of the importer country Y it : this is the direct income effect. As the banking crisis hits the income of the importer country, it also leads to lower consumption and therefore lower imports.
One question is whether the income effect is different for African exports. These are issues which have also partly been addressed by Freund (2009).
• the bilateral trade costs between countries i and j, T ijht : broadly speaking if a financial/banking crisis hits the importer country this may affect its imports over and above the direct effect it has on income. In particular, if importers or exporters rely heavily on credit for their trading relation the effect may be more important than the income effect. We call this the trade disruption effect.
• the price index of the importer country i P it : if prices fall in the importer country this has a negative impact on imports of the country.
Our baseline specification takes the form of a gravity equation augmented with crises dummies:
where m ijkt are the bilateral exports from j to i in sector k in year t. P jt is the producer price of the exporter countries, P it is the price index of the importer country, and ξ t and ν k are year and industry dummies. Year dummies capture, among others, changes in world commodity prices which are particularly important for African exports. Note that we will also estimate this equation with country (exporter and importer) fixed effects or alternatively individual (country pair-sector) fixed effects. Finally, X ij is a vector of time-invariant bilateral determinants of trade, including distance, common language, common colonizer and contiguity (which will drop out when including individual fixed effects).
BC it is a binary variable which equals 1 when country i experienced a banking crisis in year t, 0 otherwise. The coefficients β k are the coefficients of main interest in this regression. To look at the short to medium run impact of crises we will include three lags of the crises dummies (i.e. a = 0, b = 3). We will also estimate the persistent or long-run effects of the banking crises on the trade relation by introducing Our main question is whether the effect of crises in a partner country differs when the exporter is a Sub-Saharan African country. To determine this, we add to equation (2) a full set of interaction terms between the importer crises dummies and a dummy which equals 1 if country j (the exporter) is a SSA country:
Here the coefficients λ k inform us on the potential additional effect on African exporters of a banking crisis in the importer country.
Methodological issues. Two main issues, which have been largely discussed in gravity equation lit-erature, arise when estimating this equation. First, the price index of the importer country that may be hit by a banking crisis is proxied by the producer price index. However, in theoretical models from which the gravity equation is derived, this price index is the ideal price index which is not observable. imports of i from j relative to the imports of country i from a base country. Since the price index of the importer does not depend on the characteristics of the exporter, it cancels out here, which solves the mentioned issue. 2 In this case, however, we cannot estimate the average disruption effect, since the F C it terms cancel each other in the relative version of (2). However, we can still estimate whether African exports to a country hit by a banking crisis are affected differently. This estimation is then:
where the short cut ∆ b designates the fact that all variables are in difference with respect to the base country b. In the following estimations, we use USA as the benchmark country. We have checked that our results are robust to alternative benchmark countries. literature has been to treat all zeros as "true" ones. This may however generate a bias as a potentially large share of zeros are in fact missing values. 3 Each specification therefore has its limitation. As shown later, our main results are however robust to the use of these different estimation techniques.
Data
Gravity Variables. We use a large sectoral database of bilateral trade which combines COMTRADE and CEPII data for bilateral trade, for 27 ISIC 3-digit industries between 1976 and 2002. 4 To study the effect of banking crises on primary goods sectors as well, we complete this database using COMTRADE for five different primary good sectors. The relative prices are captured by the price levels of GDP; prices and GDP data come from the Penn World Tables. Due data availability, we cannot use sector-specific prices. We have run robustness checks including industry × year dummies to control for sector-specific price changes.
Crises. We focus on banking crises and the data comes from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) . Their data combines various sources. Our final dataset includes around a hundred of events, which include both, in their classification, severe and systemic banking crises. The definition of a banking crisis is therefore the one adopted and described in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) . A banking crisis is marked by two types of events (1) "bank runs that lead to the closure, merging, or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial institutions; and (2) if there are no runs, the closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important financial institution (or group of institutions), that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other financial institutions." The list of countries included in our data, together with the years of the crises, is presented in Table 7 in the appendix. This table also contains our proxies for trade finance that we will describe in more details later in the paper.
Results

Average effect of banking crises on trade
We first provide some evidence of the impact of banking crises on trade on the whole sample. To do so, we estimate equation (2), which may be biased to some extent if the producer price indices do not control for the movement of welfare based ideal price indexes. We will check the robustness of our results to the inclusion of zero trade flows by using alternatively a zero inflated poisson or a fixed effect poisson estimator. We will then turn to a more detailed investigation of the different transmission channels (income and disruption effects) and to the specific case of African countries. Table 1 contains the results. Columns early nineties. As we use in this paper sectoral bilateral trade data, this issue is a priori even more problematic. 4 A more detailed description of the trade, production and prices database is available on the CEPII's website, at the following address: http://www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/TradeProd.htm.
(1) and (2) present OLS estimations, with and without country-pair fixed effects respectively. Columns (3) to (5) contain within estimations, i.e. including dyad-sector fixed effects. In columns (4) and (5) we drop the GDP and prices variables. The change in the crisis coefficients in comparison with column (3) therefore provides information on whether the income or price effects are significant channels through which a crisis affects trade.
The standard gravity variables coefficients display the expected signs. Banking crises are found to have a negative impact on both exports and imports, with a more robust negative impact on imports which is our focus. The average yearly deviation in imports in the three years following the crisis is around -2.5% 5 when controlling for GDPs and prices (columns (1) to (3) ). Interestingly, this negative effect is found to be significant even controlling for changes in income and prices: when excluding these variables, the effect of the crisis is much more negative, up to 10% on average in the three years that follows the event. This suggests that the impact of banking crises on trade also channels through income and prices changes. Finally, accounting for zero trade flows dampens the effect of crises on imports, although their effect remains negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.
[ Table 1 ] Figures 2 and 3 are based on the estimated coefficient and confidence intervals of the specification similar to the one presented in Table 2 , respectively in columns (3) and (4), but with additional lags and a lead. It shows the deviation of bilateral imports before and after a crisis that takes place in year t = 0. The x-axis represents the "natural trade" level as given by the gravity equation, and the figure can therefore be interpreted as the deviation from this level. The 10% confidence intervals are depicted by dotted lines around the estimated effect. The rest of figures in the paper are constructed similarly even though we do not report all the associated regressions.
The estimated effect in the short-run is very close to the one presented in Table 1 . We can see in figure   2 that the average disruption effect of banking crises is moderately negative (3 to 5%) but persistent, with trade remaining below its natural level for at least four years after the event. When GDP variables are not controlled for (figure 2), the effect of banking crises is found not surprisingly to be much stronger, and more persistent (up to seven years).
[figures 2 and 3 about here] 5 Note that the coefficients on the crisis dummies cannot be directly interpreted as elasticities: the exact percentage change in exporter following a crisis in t in the importer country is (taking for instance Table 1 , column (5)) exp(−0.031)−1 = −0.03. This makes virtually no difference when the coefficient in low, but the correction becomes more important as when the effect is large. The average crisis effects reported in the regression tables throughout the paper are all computed using the above formula, so that they can be directly interpreted in terms of percentage change.
The income effect
A first channel through which a banking crisis can hit trade is directly through a fall in demand for all imports due to a fall of the income of the importers. In a standard Dixit-Stiglitz model, the effect of a change of income in country i on its imports is the same for all goods and sectors and the elasticity is one.
However, there may be reasons for which the income elasticity of demand of imports may be different in different sectors and different countries. Hence, a first question to address is whether Sub-Saharan African countries are specialized in sectors for which the income elasticity of demand is different from other countries. More formally, we want to estimate α 1 , the income elasticity of import demand. Note that this means that to estimate this elasticity, we cannot use the "relative" gravity equation (4) but (2), so that the price index potential bias cannot be fully eliminated.
The results are given in table 2. Regression (1) shows that the income elasticity for all countries is in general above unity in our sample. For African countries, this elasticity is lower as shown by the fact that the interaction between the income of the destination country and a dummy for African Exporters is significatively negative. One interpretation is that African countries are more specialized in sectors which respond less to the income level of the importer countries. However, a banking crisis is not a small change in income and it may be that the effect is not linear. In particular, it may be that the income elasticity of imports is larger during large recessions than during mild ones. This is what we test in regressions (2) to (7) where we study whether large variations in GDP have a larger effect on imports and whether African countries are more vulnerable to this type of negative shock. We construct a dummy variable which we call 'slowdown', equal to 1 when the variation of GDP between t and t-1 is lower than the first quartile of the country over the period. In both specifications, bilateral imports are found to respond more negatively to large changes in GDP: the coefficient on the slowdown variable is negative and significant even when controlling for GDP. Moreover, the impact of the slowdown variable is much higher for African exporters.
The additional negative effect is quantitatively important (exp(−0.176) − 1 =-16% in column (2) and (4), -15% when using a fixed effect Poisson estimator in column (7)). Hence, the conclusion is that African exports seem particularly vulnerable to recessions in the countries to which their export.
[ Table 2 about here]
In regressions (5) and (6), we ran the same regression as in specification (2) but separate the manufacturing and primary sectors. African exports are found to react more negatively to recessions in partner countries in both manufacturing and primary goods sectors -with a quantitatively larger effect in manufacturing sectors. Interestingly, we found that all these results are unchanged if we control for the occurrence of a banking crisis in the destination country and its interaction between with the SSA dummy. (columns (3) and (4) ). This suggests that the income effect (even in the case of recessions) and the disruption effect are two distinct mechanisms that negatively affect African exports. We now turn to the study of the disruption effect.
The disruption effect
We now analyze how African exports react after a banking crisis that takes place in the partner country, i.e. the country of destination. The results are shown in Table 3 . Remember that in these regressions, we control for the common effect that the change on the income of the importer country has on all imports, for all determinants of sectoral bilateral sectoral trade which are time invariant (through the inclusion of country pair× sector fixed effects) and for yearly changes in trade which are common to all countries (through the inclusion of year fixed effects), in particular world price movements of primary goods.
Columns (1) to (3) show the results when estimating equation (3), with or without individual fixed effects. Columns (4) shows the results using the "relative" version of the gravity equation ((4)). Columns Whatever the specification,the fall of exports following a crisis in partner country is dramatically higher for African countries. In columns (1) to (4), the additional drop of African exports in the year of the crisis is between 12 and 20%. The average additional disruption effect for these countries during the three years after the crisis starts is between 9 and 18% depending on the specification. Note that the effect is similar on average in the standard gravity results (column (3)) and when using the relative version (column (4)), except that the contemporaneous effect is smaller in the relative version. Finally, the effect decreases slightly but remains significant at the 1% level, when including the zero trade flows (columns (5) to (7)). In this case, the average additional disruption effect between t and t+3 is around between 8 and 9%. When using the relative version in column (8) the effect of crises is found to be very large: up to 55% lower for SSA countries. This result should however be considered with caution as the dependent variable (which is a ratio) is very far from being Poisson distributed. Moreover we cannot fully solve the zero trade flow problem in this specification, as the dependent variable cannot be computed when its denominator is zero.
Finally, in unreported regressions, we have also included exporter × year or sector × year dummies.
This allows in particular to control for country or sector-specific price changes which are not properly captured by our relative price variable. This may be important because African exports are dependent on world prices in primary goods. However, the inclusions of these controls left our results qualitatively unchanged.
[ Table 3 about here]
The results are illustrated on figure 4, where we run the same regression as in column (4), Table 3 but with more lags to study the longer-run effects. It shows the deviation of African exports before and after a banking crisis that takes place in year t = 0, with respect to the average disruption effect of other exporters. The x-axis therefore represents the average disruption effect. The disruption effect is stronger: the year the country is hit by a banking crisis, the additional effect for African exports is close to -20%. This specific vulnerability of African exports progressively vanishes but remains significant for four years after the event 6 . Note again that that this number measures the disruption of trade that comes from the banking crisis and not the fall of income of the crisis-hit country as this is controlled for.
[ figure 4 about here]
Country-specific effect. We have also checked whether these results was due to some particular countries in SSA, or if all SSA countries were significantly more affected than the rest of the world. In table 4 we present the average disruption effect of African exporters in the year of the crisis and the three following ones. Among the 17 considered countries, the effect is negative in 13 cases, and negative and significant in 10 of them. Only one country (Equatorial Guinea) is found to respond positively (with a p-value of 0.098). This clearly suggests that the vulnerability found before may be due to some factors that are common to most SSA countries.
[ Table 4 about here]
Origin of the crisis. Motivated by the 2008-2009 financial crisis which, at least in its initial phase was mostly concentrated on the industrialized countries, we also estimated the effect on trade depending on whether the crisis originated in a industrialized country or not. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 and Figures 5 and 6 shows again that African exporters are more vulnerable to a crisis in the countries to which they export whatever the country of origin, but remarkably, this vulnerability is stronger and more persistent when the crisis hits an industrialized country. When the banking crisis hits a non-industrialized country, the effect on its African imports is generally lower or insignificant.
[ Table 5 about here]
[ Figures 5 and 6 about here] 6 When including more lags, we find that the African trade remains negatively and significantly affected after six years.
Channels of transmission
Composition effect. We also want to better understand the sources of the larger disruption effect in African countries than in other countries. The first possibility is that African countries are specialized in sectors that are particularly vulnerable to a crisis. In particular, African exports are more concentrated on primary goods and raw materials than on manufactured goods, and trade in these goods may be more dependent on the financial system of the importing country. We test this hypothesis by distinguishing between exports of primary goods and raw materials on the one hand, and manufactured goods on the other hand. The results are presented in Table 5 , columns (3) and (4). We indeed find that African exports of primary goods and raw materials are hit more strongly by a banking crisis in the destination country than exports of manufactured goods. This is however only true in the short-run to medium-run (up to two years after the crisis).
Hence, part of the fragility of African exports to a financial crisis in the countries they export to may come from a composition effect. But clearly, the composition effect does not explain everything. The exports of African countries are much more affected by a banking crisis in the destination country, and this is true both for manufacturing and non manufacturing sectors.
Trade credit. As mentioned in section 2, one of the main reasons that may explain the drop in exports of African countries when their trading partners are facing a banking crisis is related to the disruption of trade finance. If the low level of development of their financial system forces African firms to rely more heavily on trade finance from the importing country, and if this type of financing is particularly hit by banking crises (Ronci, 2004) , exports of African countries may be hit harder whatever the sector considered. As a proxy for trade finance dependence, we first follow Ronci (2004) and use the level of outstanding short-term credit in U.S. dollars as reported in the Global Development Finance (GDF), which includes short-term credit for trade in dollars as reported by the OECD and the international banks' short-term claims as reported by the BIS. As already pointed out by Ronci (2004) , this variable has several limitations, in particular because it excludes trade financing associated with intra-firm trade by multinational corporations or trade related to foreign direct investment. On the other hand, it has a good coverage for developing countries.
For each country, we construct the average ratio of trade credit over total credit over the period. As shown in Table 7 Table 6 , columns (1) to (3).
Column (1) replicates our baseline regression on the subsample of countries for which the trade credit proxy is available: again, African countries are found to react significantly more negatively than other countries to a crisis in the destination country. Note that the additional disruption effect here is lower because we exclude developed countries, for which the proxy is not available, but that react more positively to crises than the average country.
The interactions between trade finance dependence and the crisis dummies are, as expected, negative and strongly significant (column (2)). More importantly, the vulnerability of SSA countries disappears when including these interactions: the average additional disruption effect of these countries falls from -8% (significant at the 1% level) to -1% (insignificant). This strongly suggests that trade finance dependence may explain part of the vulnerability emphasized before. Figure 7 represents the longer-run disruption effect for African countries, controlling for trade finance dependence. Almost no additional effect for African countries remains in this case.
[ Table 6 , Figure 7 about here]
Another way to see the role of trade finance dependence is to interact our banking crises variables with a dummy variable which equals 1 if the export is above the median of the sample in terms of our trade finance dependence proxy. Figure 8 represents the additional disruption effect for these exporters: they react more negatively in the short-run (around 10% more negatively than the other exporters) and for these countries, exports remain below their natural level during 5 years after a banking crisis hits their trading partners.
We also constructed another proxy for trade finance dependence, which comes from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) conducted by the WorldBank during the year 2000. Firms have been asked the percentage of their total financing coming from their suppliers. We use the country average of this variable as a proxy for dependence upon trade credit, and interact it with our banking crisis variable.
The results are shown in columns (4) to (6) of Table 6 . Again, exports of countries which display a higher dependence upon trade credit react more negatively to a banking crisis in the destination country.
Moreover, controlling for this interaction term importantly decreases the significance of the additional disruption effect on African exports (Table 6 , column (6)), which remains only significant the year of the crisis. Of course, these results should be interpreted with caution, as we use only proxies for trade finance.
They however suggest that this particular type of financing may play an important role in Africa in the aftermath of banking crises, and more generally in the transmission of banking crisis through international trade linkages.
[ Table 6 , Figure 8 about here]
Conclusion
Our paper has documented several specific features of African exports during events of banking crises.
Our main conclusion is that contrary to some arguments that have been heard early in the [2008] [2009] crisis, sub-Saharan African countries may be hit harder by the crisis through its effect on the exports of the region. Even though the direct effects of the crisis may be weaker due to the relative insulation and underdevelopment of the financial system in most sub-Saharan African countries, the indirect effect through trade may be stronger. We found that in the past banking crises, African exports have been hit harder and longer by recessions and banking crises in countries they export to. This is not only due to the composition of African exports and the concentration on primary goods. Both primary and manufactured exports are hit harder in African countries than in other regions. Another finding is that African exports are hit hardest when the importer country is an industrialized country. We have also found that the higher dependence of African exports on trade finance may explain this particular fragility of African exporters to a banking crisis in importer countries. One interpretation is that during a banking crisis when uncertainty is high, trust and liquidity are low, banks and firms in the importer country first cut exposure and credit to particular countries which are seen as more risky. This would in particular affect trade finance through letters of credit where the importer pays the exporting firm in advance. It is also likely that during banking crisis, financial institutions "renationalize" their operations and reduce their exposure to foreign banks and firms. Exporters in countries with a strong financial system may be able to better resist to such retrenchment of foreign banks. Clearly, for African firms which are more dependent on foreign finance, this option may not be feasible. At this stage, these interpretations of our results are only tentative and more research needs to be done to better understand the origin of the particular fragility of African exports to financial crises in industrialized countries. (1) to (5). c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. Other bilateral, time-invariant controls (common language, common colonizer, contiguity) not reported in column (1). Robust Standard errors, clustered by country-pair-sector, in parentheses. c significant at 10%; b significant at 5%; a significant at 1%. All estimations include country-pair, sector and year dummies. (a) Average disruption effect for crisis in importer country from t to t+3. 
